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Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few
Practical Recommendations
After extensive debate and discussion in both academic and financial
forums,' federal legislation directly regulating cash tender offers' was
enacted in 1968. This legislation, commonly called the Williams Act,'
was designed to fill a "gap" in the protection of investors left by the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The perceived lapse5 in protection
arose when public investors in the stock of a company were not in-
formed about the existence or motives of persons acquiring controlling
interests in the stock of the company.
The solution to the problem has taken the form of disclosure re-
quirements, basically divided into three areas: (1) post-acquisition
disclosure by any person or group acquiring beneficial ownership of
more than 5 percent of any class of equity securities registered pursuant
I Compare Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV.
609 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Brudney) ; Manne, Mergers and the Market for Cor-
porate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965) (hereinafter cited as Manne); Manne,
Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuxE L.J. 231 (here-
inafter cited as Manne's Reply) ; and Shtein, Some Legal Aspects of Company Take-
overs in Australia, 5 U. QUENSLAND L.J. 47 (1965) with Cohen, A Note on Takeover
Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966). See generally Hayes
& Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARv. Bus. Rnv. 135 (Mar.-Apr. 1967).
2A tender offer may be defined as a public offer or solicitation by a company,
an individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time
all or a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation
at a specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities.
Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender Invitation, 27 Bus. LAW.
415 (1972).
This note will deal only with cash tender offers. Exchange offers (stock-for-stock)
and stock tender offers are regulated by provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1970), since they are classified as "sales" of securities. Cash tender
offers, on the other hand, are regulated exclusively by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)-(e) and n(d)-(f) (1970), and the rules promulgated thereunder.
The parties to a cash tender offer (or takeover bid) are the target company (man-
agement, incumbent management), the shareholders (offerees) of the target company,
and the tender offeror (bidder, offeror, raider).
8Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §
78m-n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and n(d)-(f) (1970)).
415 U.S.C. §§ 77b-e, j, k, m, o, s, 78a-o, o to -3, p-hh (1970).
5 Much of the debate surrounding the proposed legislation dealt not with the type
or extent of regulation, but rather whether regulation was needed at all. Compare Cohen,
supra note 1, with Manne's Reply, supra note 1.
0 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970). Within ten days after the acquisition, disclosure must
be made to the issuer of the security, to each exchange where the security is traded, and
to the Commission. Exceptions to this requirement are found in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (5)
(1970) (specific exemption by the Commission) and in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (6) (B)
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to section 12,7 (2) disclosures preceding and during a tender offer" for
more than 5 percent of any class of equity securities registered pursuant
to section 12,' and (3) a general antifraud provision calling for full and
nonmisleading disclosure of material facts whet making any public
recommendations or solicitations for or against any tender offer."0 The
Act also provides various protective devices including pro rata accept-
ance of shares,"' equal payment to all tendering shareholders' and
limited withdrawal of tendered shares.
13
This note will review the concept of "material" disclosures required
by this Act, as developed in recent contested tender offers, and will
suggest remedies more consistent with the purposes of the Act than the
remedies granted in those contests. 4 Specifically, this note will deal with
the necessities of completing tender offers on schedule, will discuss the
economic and informational needs of the parties involved, and will
suggest the integration of tender offer disclosure standards into the
overall plan of investor protection.
THE WILLIAMS ACT
The underlying premise of the disclosure requirement as part of
the investor protection scheme is that investors must be given the op-
(1970) (total acquisitions [including this acquisition] not exce(ding 2 percent of a class
of security during the preceding 12 months).
7 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970), discussed infra notes 65-66 & text accompanying.
a 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970). Exceptions to this disclosure requirement are found
in 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d) (8) (A)-(C) (1970) which deal with, respectively, acquisitions
(including acquisitions pursuant to this offer) totalling not more than 2 percent of a class
of security during the preceding 12 months, acquisitions by tle issuer, and acquisitions
specifically exempted by the Commission.
9 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). This section applies to aiy tender offer, not just
those in which the target is a section 12 reporting company. Is application, then, is not
limited to those filings, solicitations or recommendations whick, as discussed below, are
subject to review by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission).
"115 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (1970).
12 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (1970).
1315 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1970). This section reads:
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders may be withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the
expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies of the offer or request
or invitation are first published or sent or given to security holders, and at any
time after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or
invitation, except as the Commission may otherwise prescribe by rules, regula-
tions, or order as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of investors.
S14None of the proposals or suggestions made will call for statutory or regulatory
amendments. All that will be needed is a correction in the interpretation of the statu-




portunity to see and evaluate relevant data so that they may make an
informed investment decision based on past, present, and future perform-
ance of the company and its stock.
The Williams Act amended section 13 of the Securities Exchange
Act 5 to require disclosure after the acquisition of "control."1 The Act
also amended section 14 to require disclosure by the bidder before a
tender offer." The regulations under both sections require the filing of
Schedule 13D' as the first step toward meeting the statutory disclosure
requirements.
Schedule 13D outlines the information to be supplied to the SEC.
Included on this schedule are
(1) identification of the security and issuer affected or to be
affected by the acquisition;
(2) identity and background of the person filing the statement
(this item deals specifically with the name, address, occupation or busi-
ness, and criminal record of the person filing the statement);
(3) source and amount of funds to be employed /for financing the
acquisition or offer;
(4) the purpose of the transaction (especially requested by this
item are any plans or proposals to liquidate, sell assets, merge, or make
any other major changes in the business or organization of the issuer);
(5) current rights or interests in the security of the issuer;
(6) contracts, arrangements or understandings with respect to the
securities;
(7) persons employed or to be compensated for making. solicita-
tions or recommendations for the offer;
(8) copies of all public invitations or advertisements.
15 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat 454, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) (1970)).
16 Acquisition of 5 percent of any class of equity security is deemed by the statute
to be sufficient to present potential control or influence. The Williams Act was amended
by the Act of December 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497, (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1)), to lower the level of acquisition from 10 percent to 5 percent to
trigger the reporting requirements. A thorough discussion of this reporting requirement
is presented in Robinson & Mahoney, Schedide i3D: Wild Card it; the Takeover Deck,
27 Bus. LAw. 1107 (1972).
17 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. § 78n
(1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1970)).
18 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1974).
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1970) requires divulgence of the information specified in
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970) plus additional information as prescribed by the Commis-
sion. Section 78m(d) provides general requirements and delegates to the Commission
the authority to prescribe rules and regulations. Accordingly, the Commission has estab-
lished Schedule 13D as the basic reporting guide.
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In addition, the tender offeror is required to present substantially all of
the Schedule 13D information to the persons being solicited'9 and is
permitted to present additional information 0 that does not violate the
Act's antifraud provision.2' Also, the offeror must specify the exact
terms of the offer.
Schedule 14D,22 which is to be filed by certain persons (including
management) making solicitations or recommendations for or against
a tender offer,23 closely parallels items 1, 6 and 7 of Schedule 13D. It
also requires copies of all solicitations or recommendations made to the
public.2"
Section 14(e), the general antifraud provision, underlies all of
these filings, solicitations and recommendations; making it
unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading, or to engage in any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or p-,actices, in con-
nection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in oppositioa to or in favor
19 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1970) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (c) (1974).
20 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(d) (1974).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
22 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1974).
23 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1974) lists communications to whicii the rules do not apply.
Included on this list are
[t]he furnishing of information and advice regarding a tender offer to
customers or clients by attorneys, banks, brokers, fiduciarie, or investment ad-
visers, who are not otherwise participating in the tender offer or solicitation,
on the unsolicited request of a person or pursuant to a general contract for
advice to the person to whom the information or advice is piven,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(e) (1974), and
[a] communication from an issuer to its security hokers which does no
more than (1) identify a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders made
by another person, (2) state that the management of the issuer is studying the
matter and will, on or before a specified date (which shall le not later than 10
days prior to the date specified in the offer, request or initation, as the last
date on which tenders will be accepted, or such shorter period as the Commis-
sion may authorize) advise security holders as to the mnnagement's recom-
mendation to accept or reject the offer, request or irivitatio a, and (3) request
security holders to defer making a determination as to whether or not they
should accept or reject the offer, request or invitation until they have received
the management's recommendation with respect thereto.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(f) (1974). 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(a) (1974), which requires the
filing of Schedule 14D, also provides, in relevant part,
[tihat this section shall not apply to (1) a person required by § 240.14d-l(a)
to file a statement, or (2) a person, other than the issuer or ,he management of
the issuer, who makes no written solicitations or recommendations other than
solicitations or recommendations copies of which have been fled with the Com-
mission pursuant to this section or § 240.14d-1.
24 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, Item 4 (1974).
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of any such offer, request, or invitation.2 5
Since the passage of the Williams Act, the courts have been strug-
gling with questions of definition and delineation in determining which
disclosures or omissions fall within the borders of "material fact" re-
quired by the statute. During 1973 and 1974, courts have had numerous
opportunities to face the question. 8 A pattern emerged: the offering
company was held to a much stricter standard of material disclosure
than was the incumbent management. Preliminary injunctive relief,
often sufficient to effectively destroy a tender offer, was readily available
to enforce compliance.2" Contrary to the expressed intent of the leg-
25 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
26 See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 1 94,595 (2d Cir. June 10, 1974), discussed infra note 120; Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin
AG 497 F.2d 394 (3d Cir.), aff'g 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J. 1974), vacating on remand
from 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.), affg Civ. A. No. 785-73 (D.N.J., July 5, 1973) (unreported
order granting injunction); Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.
1973), modifying 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), discussed infra notes 33 and 72; Gulf +
Western Indus. v. Great Ailantic & Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.), aff'g 356 F.
Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed infra notes 86, 99, 125-26 & text accompanying;
Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.), revg [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 94,007 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed infra notes
91-100 & text accompanying; Columbia Ribbon & Carbon Mfg. Co. v. Kapralos, 374
F. Supp. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ; Orbanco, Inc. v. Security Bank, 371 F. Supp. 125 (D.
Ore. 1974) ; Cauble v. White, 360 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. La. 1973) ; Elco Corp. v. Micro-
dot Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741 (D. Del. 1973); General Host Corp. v. Triumph American,
Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed infra notes 76, 77-90 & text accom-
panying; Mosinee Paper Corp. v. Rondeau, 354 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Wis. 1973); and
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973), appeal
docketed, No. 73-3137, 5th Cir., Sept. 13, 1973, temporary restraining order dissolved, un-
reported order, Oct. 10, 1973, on file with INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, appeal dismissed per
stipulation of the parties, unreported order, Dec. 6, 1973, on file with INDIANA LAW JoUR-
NAL, discussed infra notes 101-16 & text accompanying.
27 In 1973, nine cash tender offers were contested in the federal courts alleging viola-
tions of the Williams Act. See note 26 supra. All nine offers were met with, at a mini-
mum, temporary restraining orders. This situation is in marked contrast to the first years
of regulation under the Williams Act when courts were reluctant to enjoin the offers.
Compare Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir.
1973):
Thus, in the normal situation, when it appears likely that the offer may contain
materially misleading statements or omissions as made, the interest of the share-
holders and of the public in full disclosure of relevant circumstances renders
preliminary injunctive relief an appropriate method of remedying the deficiencies
in disclosure before the offer is consummated.
rd. at 250-51 (emphasis added) with Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969) :
[w] e do not mean at all that interlocutory relief should be given lightly. To
the contrary, district judges must be vigilant against resort to the courts on
trumped-up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying and thereby defeating
legitimate tender offers.
See generally Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569,
603 (1973). See also Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness,
48 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 991 (1973).
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islation, the courts have tipped the balance to favor management and
have used, improperly,28 the issue of material disclosure as the basis for
enjoining tender offers.
THE NATURE OF TENDER OFFERS
Tender offers can serve useful purposes and can have important
social consequences. An investment-oriented bidder may see what it
assesses to be a low-side disparity between the market price of a stock
and the potential price if assets were fully and efficiently utilized or
divested. A change of control via a tender offer may eliminate ineffi-
ciencies such as an accumulation of idle cash; an operation that could be
made more profitable if old, nonproducing assets were divested; or just
bad management. The change of control can also create new efficiencies
by opening up possibilities of a profitable merger.29
On the other hand, an offer may be made purely to raid or liquidate
assets to the immediate benefit of the raider and at the expense of the
public shareholders' long-run investment. Or, a takeover may be at-
tempted to eliminate, absorb, or control a competitor.
The consequences of "raiding" instigated the call for legislative
action to fill the "gap" in investor protection."0 The benefits of efficient
management inspired the restriction of legislative regulation.3
Implicit in the passage of the statute requiring only disclosure of
material information is the Congress' conclusion that investor protection
does not demand the prohibition of changes of control via tender offers.
Indeed, Senator Williams declared that he had made every effort in his
bill to balance the interests of the management, the shareholders, and
the offeror.12 These interests are not merely speculative or theoretical but
are founded in economic reality and practicality.
BUSINESS PRACTICALITIES OF COMPLETING A
TENDER OFFER ON SCHEDULE
From the Offeror's Perspective
Throughout a tender offer, management of the target is in the
driver's seat. Management can legitimately release sales and earnings
2 8 See text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
2 9 See Brudney, Manne, Manne's Reply, Shtein, Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1.
90 See Senator Williams' speech introducing S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965),
111 CoNG. REc. 28257 (1965), a predecessor of the present statute.
31See 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967).
32Id. The bill's co-sponsor, Senator Kuchel, continued to viev the bill as a method
of eliminating tender offers, feeling that raiders and looters would be deterred if they
were no longer able to hide behind a "cloak of secrecy." Id. at 857-58.
1974]
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reports, issue public relations press announcements, arrange defensive
mergers, dispose of or invest attractive assets, announce expansion pro-
grams, announce dividends, split the stock, or engage in a variety of
other activities to bolster stockholder support and influence the market's
evaluation of the value of the target stock.3
Limitation of management activity comes primarily from the anti-
fraud3 and antimanipulative" provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act.8 For the most part, these limitations deal with direct attempts to
manipulate or circumvent normal market trading in the stock. Manage-
ment, then, is generally left free to carry out "normal operations" of the
business.
A tender offer is ordinarily programmed to have a very short dura-
tion, usually from two to six weeks." In almost all cases, the bidder
attaches a premium price to the stock to make the offer attractive to a
large number of holders.38 The reason for the short duration and the
premium price is to prevent the offer from being defeated by manage-
ment's defensive activity. 9 Compilation of data or evaluation of invest-
ment/divestment opportunities by management may require extensive
3 3 See Brudney, supra note 1, at 619, and Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1. See also
Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 362 F. Supp. 939, 943-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), where
management's defensive tactics can be summarized as including:
(1) a letter to stockholders urging them to take no action pending a thorough study
by management;
(2) a second letter stating that the offer price was "inadequate";
(3) a declaration of a 30 cents per share regular quarterly dividend and an extra
25 cents per share cash dividend and a 10 percent stock dividend payable to holders of
record after the scheduled expiration date of the tender offer;
(4) a press release announcing these dividends;
(5) a press release summarizing second quarter operations;
(6) a press release summarizing the allegations in the litigation;
(7) a letter to each shareholder discussing the allegations, the dividend declaration,,
and stating that the dividend would reduce the offer price; and
(8) hundreds of telephone calls to shareholders urging them to reject the offer.
3415 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
85 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970). For a full explanation of the antifraud and antimanipula-
tive provisions see Jacobs, Regulation of Manipulation by SEC Rule iob-5, 18 N.Y.L.F.
511 (1973).
36 Other limitations may also arise under the blue sky laws and insider-trading rules.
37 The schedule established by the offeror also includes a starting time for the offer.
The timing may be arbitrary; it may be based on the availability of an attractive target
asset; or it may be based on a consideration of several factors such as the current market
price of the stock, historic price action of the stock, the magnitude of institutional hold-
ings, the trading activities in the target stock and generally in the market, and the ac-
tivities of arbitrageurs dealing in the target stock. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1,
at 139-41.
38 The size of the premium is based on the same considerations that determine the
timing of the offer. Id.
39 The Williams Act also provides an incentive to complete the offer quickly by
allowing the withdrawal of tendered shares if they have not been purchased within 60
days of the original tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1970), quoted supra note 13.
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investigation over a long time span.4" Any management action calling
for stockholder approval may take even longer.
From Management's Perspective
Management is interested in seeing the swift failure of a tender
offer. Management and the target company are primarily affected in
four ways during an offer: (1) much of management's time and energy
may be expended in dealing with the offer, (2) a great deal of corporate
funds may be diverted to defensive activity or litigating the offer, (3)
relations with suppliers and customers may be strained by uncertainty
about the future operations of the company and its ability to meet con-
tractual obligations, and (4) the stock price of the company is being sub-
jected to aberrational influences. Therefore, the primary legitimate
objective of the target management is to return quickly to business as
usual.
From the Stockholder's Perspective
To the extent that the previously listed effects influence the value
of the stockholder's investment, he is interested in the swift completion
of the tender offer-preferably, a completion favorable to the manage-
ment team that he thinks will give him the best return on-his investment.
A tendering shareholder is also interested in avoiding interferences
affecting the status of his "sale." Temporary injunctions or delays in
the schedule may leave the tenderor in limbo, not knowing if his sale
will be consummated or if he still owns the stock. This situation is
especially harmful if profitable trading opportunities are foregone or if
the shares are unavailable to apply as collateral for needed credit.
Litigation as a Tool to Disrupt Timing
Knowing that the timing of a tender offer is critical to its success,
management may use its potentially most potent weapon-litigation.41
A simple preliminary injunction, by delaying and disrupting the offer
-0 The speed with which management can respond may be irdicative of the efficiency
of the management; i.e., no current data available or the absence of data on opportunities
may indicate that management is not really paying optimal attention to benefits or prob-
lems facing the company. On the other hand, theoretically, a good management is con-
stantly up to date and working on prospects and problems.
4 1 See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 1, at 146. Management may also subject itself
to litigation by refusing to supply the bidder with lists of stoclholders. If the offeror
is already a stockholder with a "proper business purpose" for obtaining the list, it must
eventually be turned over, but the delaying tactic is useful. See Wander, Selecting Tar-
gets and Shaping Strategy in Corporate Take-overs: Securities Law Considerations, 24
Sw. L.J. 593, 600 (1970).
19741
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schedule, may effectively destroy the offer by allowing time for success-
ful management defensive tactics or the intervention of extrinsic con-
ditions.' If the Williams Act's delicately balanced objectives-full dis-
closure to investors but otherwise no discouragement of tender offers-
are to be achieved, preliminary injunctive relief must not be readily
available as a standard management defensive tactic."3 Only in those
cases where investor protection cannot be otherwise adequately obtained
should a preliminary remedy, potentially destructive of the tender offer,
be available.
When a court is presented with the initial petition for preliminary
injunctive relief, it should consider, in weighing the equities, the time
and expense invested by a tender offeror in evaluating and planning an
offer before it decides to intercede on behalf of incumbent management
and thereby upset the schedule of a tender offer. Fairness may also
govern the extent to which management is allowed, via schedule-
disrupting litigation, to implement the plans disclosed by the offeror
and thereby deny the offeror his investment opportunity. From a
social viewpoint, the investigator and planner of major changes may
have the better ability to fully implement those major changes." Con-
tinual judicial intervention may discourage tender offers and deprive
the investors of the anticipated benefits.
A GUIDELINE FOR "MATERIALITY"-AN INTEGRATED DISCLOSURE RULE
An investor presented with a tender offer is called upon, essentially,
to make a new investment decision based on changing circumstances in
a current investment. The intent of Congress was not to make the deci-
sion for the stockholder, but to provide him with all the "material"
information he would need to make his own decision.' "Materiality"
42 Consider the impact of a sudden, sharp upturn in the market, the announcement
of a competing tender offer at a higher price, the arrangement of a merger between the
target and another company, or a major change in interest rates or margin requirements
that would disrupt the offeror's means of financing the offer.
Congress recognized the importance of the offer schedule. The legislation enacted
speaks not of time lags or time spans, but only of sharcholder-protection devices if the
bidder voluntarily extends or modifies the offer.
43 judge Friendly, in Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409
F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1968), issued the warning: "[D]istrict judges must be vigilant
against resort to the courts on trumped-up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying
and thereby defeating legitimate tender offers."
44The person who plans major changes may have a better grasp of the scope and
necessities of the interrelationships between facets of the plan. Also, an outsider, without
longstanding loyalties and friendships, may be less restrained when divesting outmoded
or unprofitable operations.
-1 But, when contemplating his decision to tender or not tender, he has an enigmatic
need for information and a paradoxical choice of action to take. The stockholder must
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has been defined in many contexts, but the basic tet can be summarized
as whether a reasonable investor might (or would) have considered the
facts in question to be important in the making of his decision." The
pivotal points in this test are the standards of "reasonableness" to be
applied and the requisite propensity to affect the decision."7 A third
variable will be the level of culpability required of the defendant before
an action can be maintained against him.4"
determine not only the relative desirability of the competing ranagement teams and the
compensation provided by the premium, but also the probability of success or failure of
the offer (how many other shareholders will tender based on their determinations). On
the one hand, the shareholder may prefer the raider, therefcre wanting to retain his
status as a minority shareholder. On the other hand, he may prefer present management
and want to sell his stock at an attractive price before the tak,.over. In either case, his
decision will have an adverse effect on the outcome he desires (changing or retaining
managements).
4 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54, rehearing denied,
407 U.S. 916 (1972) (Rule lOb-5); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384
(1970) (proxy solicitations) ; Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dre3ser Indus., 383 F.2d 840,
843 (2d Cir. 1967) ; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 811 (1965). But cf. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., 403 F.2d 159, 162
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), where the court, after distinguishing
the contested election in this case from proxy solicitations and prospectus disclosures,
stated:
The test, we suppose, is whether, taking a properly realistic view, there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the misstatement or omission may have led a stockholder
to grant a proxy to the solicitor or to withhold one from the other side, whereas
in the absence of this he would have taken a contrary course.
The court based its distinction on the fact that a contested election is a choice between
management teams and is decided by more subjective criteria than the mathematical analy-
sis of proposed transactions or the market attractiveness of stock.4 7 An unresolved dispute exists as to whether the misinformation must cause the
investor to act wrongly ("would" affect the decision), or whether it must merely present
him with the opportunity to make the wrong decision ("mi~ht!' affect the decision).
See note 48 infra.
48If the public policy is to vigorously protect investors, then actio.is will be allowed
for any negligent omissions or misstatements that might affect the ir vestor's decision.
However, judicial interpretations of some of the applicable statutes and regulations con-
cerning disclosure have limited the promotion of this preferre:d policy. For example,
Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), covering vohuntary disclosures, utilizes "evil"
language (devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud). Because the "evil" sounding
language limits the scope of the Commission's rulemaking authority and because of a
desire to prtmote voluntary disclosure, private rights of action have been limited to those
cases where scienter can be shown. Yet, only minimal causation ("might" affect the de-
cision) needs to be shown. Cf. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.
1973).
At the opposite end of the spectrum is Rule 14a-9, 17 C.:F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1974),
which covers required disclosures in proxy statements. The language of this rule is very
broad and does not carry with it the "evil" connotations of Rule lOb-5. Because of the
general language of Rule 14a-9, negligent omissions on missratements are actionable.
However, since the disclosures are required and since negligence is actionable, the courts
have decided to avoid placing unduly harsh burdens on the potential defendant and have
thus held that an action would lie only if the omission or misstatement would affect the
decision. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., supra.
The Williams Act antifraud provision, section 14(e), lies somewhere between Rule
lob-5 and Rule 14a-9. It contains the "evil" language of Rule lob-5 and the general
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Since response to a tender offer is, in most cases, an investment
decision, regulation under the Williams Act should fit coherently into
the entire scheme of disclosure in investment regulation. It is important
to note at the outset that disclosure of plans and proposals break with an
SEC tradition prohibiting projections and other references to the future
unless they are grounded in a certain level of present intent and certainty
of bccurrence. The traditional rules developed under the basic securities
laws should, at least as applied to currently available information, provide
relevant precedent for the specificity of any disclosure required or con-
tributed and should define -to whom the disclosures are directed. The
traditional exceptions to the traditional rules should also provide a basis
for the allowability of information regarding plans and proposals.
Therefore, a discussion of these rules and exceptions is necessary before
enforcement of the Act can be considered.
The Securities Act of i933"
The Securities Act furnishes the first set of regulations concerning
disclosures with respect to the issuance of a security. Four aspects of
this statute and the rules promulgated thereunder have particular rele-
vance to this discussion. First, "material" is defined as a term to limit
the disclosures required: disclosures are limited to "those matters as to
which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
.... "" Second, plans, proposals or other words relating to the future
refer only to present intentions." Third, the issuer need only disclose
information known or reasonably available and may omit information
if obtaining it would involve unreasonable effort or expense. 2 Fourth,
"material" is apparently a much broader categorization than "necessary
for the protection of investors" because some material contracts can re-
main secret if disclosure would impair their value and not be necessary
for protection of investors."
language of Rule 14a-9. Also, section 14(e) covers both required and voluntary dis-
closures. Chris-Craft Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (1973), held that,
like Rule lOb-5, section 14(e) also imposes a scienter element Id. at 363. See also id. at
393 (Gurfein, J., concurring). However, without discussing the finer points of the issue,
the court applied a test of whether the investor's decision would be affected. The same
court later stated in Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., supra (construing Rule 14a-9),
that a "would" test was appropriate in that case because negligence was actionable. But,
by failing to speak for all cases, the court implied that a "might" test may be appropriate
when scienter was a required element of the action. Id. at 1301-02.
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970).
5017 C.F.R. § 230A05(l) (1974).
5' 17 C.F.R. § 230.407(c) (1974).
52 17 C.F.R. § 230.409 (1974).
53 17 C.F.R. § 230.485 (1974).
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The aforementioned regulations apply to the registering of new
securities and to the prospectuses presented to potential investors.54
They govern the initial stages of placing in the market a security that
may later become the target of a tender offer. Taken as a whole, the
registration and prospectus regulations provide a restrictive concept of
materiality and limit the information that must or can be disclosed.
This restrictive concept is carried forward in the Securities Exchange
Act passed the following year."
The Securities Exchange Act of 19346
The Exchange Act encompasses most aspects of trading in secur-
ities, particularly with an end towards ensuring fair and open dealing
for the protection of investors. As under the Securities Act, the Ex-
change Act regulations define "materiality" as a factor limiting the ex-
tent of disclosure necessary to protect an "average prudent investor.""7
5' 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970).
Consideration of Securities Act registration and prospectu,; disclosures has attained
particular appropriateness since the promulgation of Rule 145, 17 C.F.RL § 230.145 (1974).
The thrust of this rule is to make applicable the Securities Act registration requirements
when there is submitted to security holders a plan or agreement pursuant to
which such holders are required to elect, on the basis of % hat is in substance a
new investment decision [i.e., mergers, consolidations, or saks of assets], whether
to accept a new or different security in exchange for their existing security.
Id., preliminary note. Such matters were previously not considered a "sale" of securities,
17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1971), and were, thus, covered only by the disclosure requirements
for proxy solicitations under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 It.S.C. § 14(a) (1970).55 See notes 56-68 infra & text accompanying.
ra 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b-e, j, k, m, o, s, 78a-o, o to -3, p-hh (1970).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1974). An important exception to the "average pru-
dent investor" standard arises under the insider trading restrictions enforced under section
10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974). SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), ecrt. denied, 394 U.S. 976(1969), expanded the category of "reasonable investor" to include even chartists and
speculators, inasmuch as they needed the same protection as conservative investors when
both groups were trading with insiders without the benefit of tle knowledge available to
the insiders.
Rule lob-5 is distinguishable from its progeny, section 14(e), because insider trading
differs from a tender offer in an extremely important aspect-a person in a peculiar posi-
tion to have knowledge (the insider) is attempting to act on information for his own
profit by covertly circumventing normal market value-adjustment machinery-buying or
selling on the basis of information before that information becomes public. On the other
band, a tender offeror puts the investment market on notice that changes are forthcoming
and invites the intervention of market activity and speculation. In other words, an in-
sider trades in a false atmosphere of normality in the market for the stock. Conversely,
the tender offer creates an abnormal atmosphere that invites investigation, putting the
particular investor on notice to seek out other information that he alone "might" require
in making his investment decision; whereas the withholding or misstatement of inside
information deprives all outside investors the opportunity to irvestigate thoroughly the
entire realm of information to determine for themselves what information is material.
Therefore, for Rule lOb-5 purposes, the scope of "materiality" must be much broader to
1974]
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Under the Securities Exchange Act general guidelines for measur-
ing the materiality of information as pertinent to protecting investors
may be derived from the annual reporting requirements. Annual re-
ports submitted to the shareholders provide the primary basis for evaluat-
ing the worth of an investment by presenting factual data and man-
agerial interpretations from which the stockholder can calculate and
determine his course of action in regard to increasing, maintaining or
trading his holdings.
Section 14"8 provides for annual reporting to the shareholders, sub-
section (a) applying when proxies are solicited and subsection (c) being
applicable in the absence of proxy, consent or authorization solicitation.
Schedules 14A " and 14C, 0 required for compliance with section 14,
prescribe the type and extent of disclosures.
Items 14 of Schedules 14A and 14C, dealing with mergers, con-
solidations and acquisitions, are particularly relevant because such
matters are also deemed to involve an election of officers under most
circumstances.6 Generally, the issuer is required to furnish a brief
outline of the material features of the plan"2 and brief descriptions of
the other party's business and financial standing as are "essential to
an investor's appraisal of the action proposed to be taken.1 3  It is clear
from these requirements that detailed itemizations of all aspects of the
proposal are not required as necessary for the protection of investors.
Items 16,4 dealing with proposals to acquire or dispose of property,
require a more stringent response to questions in areas that would have
an immediate impact on the evaluation of the stock; they call for state-
ments of the nature and amount of consideration to be paid or received
and an outline of facts bearing on the fairness of the consideration.
Further, under the Exchange Act, one of the two ways a company
can achieve section 12 reporting status,"5 and thus gain the protections
encompass all investors who are deprived of any accurate information upon which to
base their decisions. See also note 48 supra.
58 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(a), (c) (1970).
5917 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1974).
t0 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-101 (1974). Item 1 of this schedule requires that all the in-
formation required by Schedule 14A (except Items 1, 3, and 4) be furnished. Because
of this cross-reference, citations to Schedule 14C will include by reference the itemization
of Schedule 14A.
81 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, note A (1974).
62 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 14(a) (1974).
6317 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 14(b) (1974).
64 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 16 (1974).
85 The other way is to have assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of equity security




of the Williams Act, is to be listed on an organized exchange.6" Many
of these markets have elaborate rules including disclosure requirements
which provide for even more current information flows. For example,
the New York Stock Exchange Company Manua6 7 makes clear that:
A corporation whose stock is listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change is expected to release quickly to the public any news or in-
formation which might reasonably be expected to materially affect
the market for securities. This is one of the most important and
fundamental purposes of the listing agreement which each corpora-
tion enters into with the Exchange.68
In other words, the NYSE requires that the management make informa-
tion available as soon as it is no longer possible to maintain secrecy
within the highest levels of the management. The purpose of this re-
quirement is to keep all material information in front of the public
insofar as it might affect stock prices and values.
A Viable Standard
The foregoing discussion suggests that the investor-protection
scheme envisioned by Congress and the SEC was aimed toward an
average prudent investor who would make decisions based on an overall
view of a corporation's history and prospects. Disclosure of information
material to and necessary for the making of an informed decision is
required by the statutes and regulations and by the rules of the stock
exchanges.
The similarities between merger or consolidation situations and
tender offer situations provide sufficient basis for using the regulation
of the former as an interpretive guide for regulation of the latter. Both
situations represent fundamental changes in the corporation, its struc-
ture and its management. More importantly, both situations arise during
the operating life of the corporation, and thus during regular informa-
tion flows from management. 9 Because investor-held knowledge of
68 15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1970). By statute, "exchange" means
any organization, association, or group of persons . . . which constitutes,
maintains, or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together pur-
chasers and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing . . . the functions
commonly performed by a stock exchange as that term is generally under-
stood ....
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1) (1970).
S67 See the discussion of this looseleaf guide in D. VAGTs, BAsIC Coi'oRAiOkr LAW
585 (1973).
68 Id. (footnote omitted).
189 Most mergers, consolidations or tender offers occur during aberrational phases
of the company's history, which would suggest that management may be providing a
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this regular information is presupposed, regulation of both situations
requires only a minimum level of new disclosures and permits additional
disclosures by those persons or groups promoting the changes. Both
situations also provide the machinery and limitations for disclosure by
those persons or groups opposing the change." In all, both situations
may involve an adversary atmosphere wherein both sides seek to promote
their own interests and serve as watchdogs over their opposition-with
the SEC and the courts available to oversee the contest and protect the
interests of the stockholders in the middle.
The previously discussed areas of regulation, the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act, should have operated to keep infor-
mation about current operations, assets, or opportunities of the target
company in the hands of the stockholders via the medium of manage-
ment disclosure of all information material to the investment decision.
If, however, management has deemed information to be immaterial or
not requiring detailed disclosure before a tender offer, it is difficult
to comprehend, in most cases, how this information could suddenly
become more important to the investor during or after a tender offer.
The regulations, the transilient nature of investments, and the investors'
constant need for information that will affect the value of their invest-
ments will have required the disclosure of all material information.
Because of management's continuing obligation to provide current
material information, an offeror should normally have no need to
reiterate information provided by management7' but should be re-
quired to provide substantially similar information about itself if that
information was not previously publicly available.72 If, however, man-
agement has failed in its obligation to disclose material information re-
garding the internal operations of the company, the SEC's enforcement
higher than normal information flow to soothe stockholder concern or to combat the
aberrational influences.
70 An important distinction between merger or consolidation situations and tender
offer situations is the amount of dissenting information allowed. Rules 14a-7 and -8, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-7, -8 (1974), limit, in a practical sense, the amount of information
that can be presented in opposition to a proposal for which proxies are solicited.
On the other hand, the Williams Act and supporting regulations place no limits at
all on the extent of dissenting information. In fact, the Act may allow management to
transcend traditional limits on plans and projections if the Act is read to permit, if not
require, equivalent disclosures by both sides during communications with shareholders.
71 One possible exception may be those persons who recently bought into the target
company without reviewing the available information.72 See Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 362 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y.), modified,
[1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff 94,108 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd in part, re-
manded in part, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir.), on remand [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 94,220 (S.D.N.Y. November 15, 1973), where, for the first time, the bid-
der, a closed corporation, was required to disclose financial information about itself.
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powers or the court's equity jurisdiction can operate to supplant man-
agement's judgment and order disclosure by either side.7 The important
point to be drawn from management's prior failure to disclose is that
the failure should not in itself be grounds for enjoining a tender offer.
Quite the contrary, if the information is material to the investment
decision, the courts can exercise their equitable powers to order the
disclosure. If management has failed to perform its responsibility and
has chosen not to make the disclosures as a defensive tactic, the courts
should not necessarily deprive the offeror and th! investors of their
opportunities because of management's actions.
If the offeror is truly interested in the success of its offer, it may
be willing to amend its offer information to include the newly available
information. If this condition is met, the court has an alternative to
unconditionally enjoining the tender offer. If the court deems it neces-
sary and the offending party is willing, immediate disclosure may be
ordered on the condition that the offer or recommendation will be
enjoined if compliance is not forthcoming. 4 If satisfactory disclosure
is made, the purpose of the Williams Act-adequate information to the
investor-will have been fulfilled and no reason will exist to further
enjoin the offer or recommendations.
To summarize, a strict scrutiny by the court of any alleged material
omission or misstatement ought to be required in litigation seeking the
enjoining of a tender offer. Standards for materiality, for both current
operating conditions and plans and projections, shculd be drawn from
the commonly understood principles administered under the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. A tender offer situation is simply another
type of investment opportunity, and the potential holder or seller of
shares needs the same basic information in all cases.
Secondly, if after this exacting scrutiny a court concludes that a
bit of information omitted from or misstated in the tender offeror's
solicitation is indeed material, the court should next consider whether
the information has been, or under the relevant reporting requirements
ought to have been, disclosed by management of the target. If not, dis-
closure by the tender offeror is clearly called for. But if management
should have disclosed but did not, or did so too long ago or in some
73 The SEC or the court could order management to clarify or complete earlier dis-
closure if the offeror cross-complained alleging misleading statements by management.74 It is important to distinguish this conditional injunction from that proposed in
Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tendernevs, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991
(1973), which would enjoin first and then dissolve the injunction after satisfactory dis-
closure. Id. at 1016.
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other context which does not provide adequate protection to the investor
in this case, the court should balance the investor's need for the infor-
mation against any probable harm to the offeror from an injunction
disrupting the offer schedule. Weighed into this balance should be the
likelihood of management disclosure of the information as a defensive
tactic if the injunction is denied and the possibility of an equitable order
requiring management to disclose the information."'
Finally, if after this balancing process the court still con-
cludes that disclosure by the offeror is required, consideration should be
given to the possibility of a conditional injunction, enjoining the tender
offer after, say, ten days unless the offeror satisfactorily discloses to
the offeree stockholders. Such a conditional injunction, if appropriate,
is a better recognition of the statutory purpose of the Williams Act-
a finely tuned balance between providing adequate investment informa-
tion and not unnecessarily discouraging tender offers. It may often
be possible to provide the needed information without fatal disrup-
tion of the tender offer which could result from use of an unconditional
preliminary injunction.
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF RECENT DECISIONS
A review of several recent cases highlights the extent to which
courts have tended to presume the materiality of information omitted or
misstated by the offeror. These cases also illustrate that management
of the target corporation has been able to protect itself by projecting a
new aura of materiality onto information which it had previously con-
sidered immaterial or unnecessary for the protection of its shareholders.
Conversely, those courts have undervalued the irreparable harm to the
bidder and, quite often, have not even considered the impact on the in-
vestors.
The test now applied before a preliminary injunction can issue
requires a showing of a
combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility
of irreparable injury, or that [plaintiff] has raised serious questions
going to the merits and that the balance of hardship is tipped
sharply in its favor.76
The tendency to presume "materiality" and to ignore whose duty it was
in the first instance to disclose the information ensures that the plaintiff's
75 See note 73 supra & text accompanying.
76 General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749, 753 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (emphasis in original).
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allegations raise "serious questions going to the merits" and even
guarantees "probable success on the merits" of any claim of material
omissions or misstatements. Rather than using other equitable remedies,
recent courts have opted for far-reaching temporary restraining orders
followed by preliminary injunctions and often followed by injunctions
pending appeals (regardless of who won on the merits at trial).
In General Host Corp. v. Triumph Americav, Inc.,77 the target,
Host, sought to enjoin the tender offer on grounds of violations of the
Federal Communications Act,"' violations of the Shipping Act, 9 and
violations of the Office of Foreign Direct Investment rules (violations
resulting if a successful tender offer transferred control to a foreign
corporation). Host also alleged Triumph's failure to disclose foreign
government control, intentions as to disposition of I-ost's liquid assets,8"
and that a "group" was behind the offer. Host further alleged violations
of margin requirements.
After stating its test for issuing a preliminary injunction,8 "the
Court . . . proceeded on the premise that relief should issue it Host
has borne its burden on at least one of the issues raised."82 The court
chose to consider the alleged section 14(e) violations, especially the
matters of the liquid assets and foreign control.83
This court stated:
The test for materiality requires that Host must establish that
the facts omitted or misrepresented were material facts in the sense
that a reasonable "prototype" investor might have considered them
important in the making of his decision to tender or not tender in
response to Triumph's tender offer.8 '
The court found the omissions to be material-a just decision since the
types of limitations and regulations to be violated ould not be known
to the investors nor would the investors normally consider them to be
relevant to the continuation of the corporation.85
7359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (hereinafter the parties will be referred to as
Host and Triumph).
7847 U.S.C. § 310 (1970).
7946 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835 (1970).
80 Host was an attractive target because it held $35 million in cash and marketable
securities left over after it liquidated 54 percent of Armour & Co. stock obtained in an
unsuccessful tender offer.81 See note 76 supra & text accompanying.
82359 F. Supp. at 753.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 A shareholder would not normally know the restrictions imposed upon a radio
or shipping license. He would usually just consider these licenses to be part of the
operation of the company. However, these restrictions become extremely relevant if
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Ominously, this court quoted an earlier case out of context,8
concluding that material misrepresentations were unlawful, should not
be permitted and, therefore, that injunctive .relief should issue without
regard for the balancing and protection of the various interests in-
volved.17 This stance is directly contrary to the intent of the statute and
the whole of securities law which is directed toward promoting dis-
closure and allowing free and open trading in securities. A more
correct approach would have been to order disclosure of information
relating to the various relevant regulations and allow the investors to
decide for themselves whether they wanted to invest in a company
subject to the restrictions and loss of assets.
Specifically rejecting Triumph's assertions that an injunction would
allow time for others to make tender offers or that Host would have time
to place obstacles in the way of a tender offer, the court concluded that
Triumph would not be foreclosed from renewing its offer if vindicated
at a trial on the merits.88 Five days after Triumph announced its tender
offer (while this action was awaiting hearing), another tender offer for
Host was announced, "9 and six months later, Host was negotiating a
merger with another company.9"
In Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates,0'
Sonesta, the target, sought a preliminary injunction alleging that the
bidder failed to disclose adequately (1) an ongoing litigation between
them, giving rise to an unsatisfied judgment and another alleged debt
totalling $2.4 million; (2) the bidder's plan to defeat certain proposals
which might lead to a two dollar per share tax-free distribution to
shareholders; (3) the source of financing for the tender offer; (4) the
probability that the target would be de-listed from the New York Stock
they cause the loss of the license and, thereby, force the abandonment of a major source
of revenue to the company.
86 The court quoted Gulf + Western Indus. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
476 F.2d 687, 698-99 (2d Cir. 1973), where that court held that there was no right to
proceed with a tender offer unlawfully violating antitrust laws.
87 359 F. Supp. at 759.
This Court has determined that there is the probability that there has been an
unlawful tender offer in that Host shareholders have not been honestly and
fairly informed by Triumph. Triumph has no inherent right to proceed with
an unlawful tender offer.
Id.
88 Id. at 758-59.
89 N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1973, at 59, col. 4.
*0 N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1973, at 59, col. 7; id., Oct. 4, 1973, at 66, col. 2; id., Oct. 11,
1973, at 70, col. 4. However, the negotiations were terminated without any reason given.
Id., Nov. 13, 1973, at 72, col. 4.
91 [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ff 94,007 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 483
F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973). (The parties will be referred to as Sonesta and Wellington.)
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Exchange if the offer were completely successful; and (5) the back-
grounds and reputations of the bidders, namely that several of the
bidder's buildings were allegedly used for massage parlors, pornographic
film theaters and peep shows, and that this background would adversely
affect the reputation and credit rating of the target."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, again quoting out of con-
text, once more applied the theory that material omissions were unlaw-
ful and, therefore, dispositive of the question of whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. This time the court added that there is a
public interest to be protected."
The appellate court found that
[t]he most persuasive claim by Sonesta is that Wellington did
not sufficiently disclose that it owed more than $2.4 million to
Sonesta and that this debt might be compromised on terms adverse to
Sonesta shareholders if Wellington should succeed in acquiring
control of Sonesta.9
In fact, the "debt" owed was comprised of a $500,000 undisputed claim
and a judgment for $1.89 million which was still on appeal.9 5 Wel-
lington did disclose that it intended to "influence the position taken by
Sonesta" and that it was "possible that Sonesta will receive less than it
would if Wellington does not acquire control of Sonesta." 9 The court
required a numerical disclosure of the full amount: at stake." If the
amount at stake was, indeed, material to the operation of the business
and the value of Sonesta shares, this information Ehould already have
been made available to the shareholders by the management. Thus,
Wellington's statement would have been sufficient to put the share-
holders on notice of the extent to which share values could change.
Sonesta also claimed that Wellington failed to disclose that it
planned to defeat two proposals to liquidate leasehold interests in two
hotels. Such defeat would preclude potential bencfits for the share-
holders. Beneficial effects would occur only if the sales were success-
fully closed and Sonesta could obtain a favorable tax ruling. If those
things occurred, anticipated extraordinary losses were expected to
92 A New York Post article had made the original damaging allegations. Id. at 254.
3 Id. at 250-51. The court quoted Mills v. Electric Auto-Lita Co., 396 U.S. 375, 383
(1970), which was merely stating that stockholders have a privat(, right of action against
proxy fraud, independent of the "fairness" of the transaction.
4 483 F.2d at 251-52.
95 The district court found that there was no "debt" owing until litigation was com-
pleted. [1973 Transfer Binder] at 94,059.




offset the gains from the sale and the gains could be distributed to share-
holders. The court observed that "[n]o sound reason appears why the
full circumstances of the possible defeat of the proposals . . . should
not have been set forth in the offer in the first instance."" If the full
circumstances of the proposal were actually material to the proxy vote
that was to approve the sale, management should have already pre-
sented this information to the shareholders in the proxy and annual
meeting materials. Failure of management to fully inform stockholders
of all material facts surrounding their own proposal should not have
been sufficient grounds for enjoining the tender offer.
Concerning Sonesta's claim that its reputation would be impaired
and that this should have been disclosed, the facts show, and both courts
acknowledged, that Wellington was the owner of a number of reputable
hotels and that Wellington had instituted a suit for libel against the
New York Post' Company for making the harmful allegations. The ap-
pellate court decided that Sonesta's claim (and its repetition of the
libel) emanated from "overzealousness."99
') Id. at 253.
99 Id. at 254.
An additional example of judicial unwillingness to apply the strict materiality
standards to communications by the offeree management is seen in the lower court opinion
in Gulf + Western Indus. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), where the bidder, G + W, sought to enjoin the target from violating
section 14(e), alleging false and misleading statements and omissions of material facts.
G + W specifically challenged a press release which stated that the offer price was
-"inadequate" and that the consummation of the offer "raises most serious questions under
the antitrust laws." Id. at 1070. G + W also challenged a letter from A & P to its
shareholders which gave a summary progress report, reiterated that the offer price was
"inadequate" because of a book value of more than the offer price, repeated (without
explanation) the antitrust charge and omitted any reference to previous losses, dividend
declines, and the low market price of the stock. Id. at 1075-76.
The antitrust allegations are somewhat questionable. Charles Bluhdorn, board chair-
man and chief executive officer of G + W, also owned a controlling interest in Bohack
Corporation, A & P's leading competitor in the New York City area. Prior to the tender
offer, Bluhdorn and other G + W officers resigned from the board of Bohack and
Bluhdorn placed his Bohack stock in a voting trust to be sold within one year if the
tender offer were successful. G + W also had an established policy against reciprocal
dealing. The district court settled the question in favor of A & P by stating that, al-
though the claims were totally unproven, "[t]he Court is left, therefore, with a claim and
an intuitive feeling that at sometime in the future the claim might be proven." Id. at 1073.
The district court also found that a bare claim of price inadequacy or a claim sup-
ported by a "book value" was not misleading because price is subjective and not only
controlled by "mathematical formulae, but by the intuition or 'hunch' of the buyers and
sellers of the stock' and by "the whims and caprice of the crowd." Id. at 1071. Manage-
ment's letter to the stockholders not only reported record sales, but also implied a "turn-
around" in earnings and ability to pay dividends. Id. at 1075-76. This was not the case.
A & P experienced earnings losses through the next quarter and passed another dividend.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 28, 1973, at 41, col. 2; id., Apr. 13, 1973, at 57, col. 4. Book value is
inherently misleading and is especially so when unaccompanied by explanations of valua-
tion procedure. See Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1092 (10th Cir. 1972);
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In ordering a preliminary injunction against consummation of
the tender offer unless Wellington disclosed all the facts found to be
material, the Second Circuit held that
[t]he obligation is placed squarely on those madng the offer in
the first instance to disclose all material factors necessary to make
their offer not misleading. That duty cannot be shifted to the
shoulders of others. 00
In Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp.," the trial court
had a solid grasp on the concepts and interests involved but lacked the
creativity necessary to promote the purposes of the statute. The tender
offer had come as a complete surprise to management."0 2 Texasgulf
immediately summoned a board meeting and began issuing press releases,
urging its shareholders not to act hastily but to wait until management
had investigated the offer. No one at the board meeting questioned the
legality or* adequacy of the offer but merely determined to "stop the
clock" to have time to organize their defense. A blank check was
delivered to their attorney with instructions to find any method to buy
time.'Y No Schedule 14D0  was ever filed by management, nor were
the shareholders ever informed as to management's evaluation of the
deal. Texasgulf filed a petition on July 27 seeking a temporary restrain-
ing order and a hearing for a preliminary injunction alleging section
14(e) violations. Both were granted. CDC counterclaimed for a pre-
liminary injunction, citing the Schedule 14D violation, and asked for
a modification of the temporary order to allow receipt of the tendered
shares by a depository. The modification was granted. One and one-
half hours before the hearing, Texasgulf sought and received a one-
day delay to amend its complaint to allege antitrust violations. On
August 8 Texasgulf was preliminarily enjoined from communicating
D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 112 (1973). Proper application of disclosure re-
quirements would also require precision and accuracy when making or implying predic-
tions of future growth and earnings of the company. If the district court had been truly
interested in supplying investors with material information from which they could them-
selves make an investment decision, an order of correction or an injunction against
further similar recommendations would have been appropriate in this case.
100 483 F.2d at 255.
101 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (hereinafter referred to as Texasgulf). (The
parties will be referred to as Texasgulf and CDC.)
102The tender offer was proposed to CDC's board of directors on July 23, 1973, and
approved by the board the next morning. Texasgulf management was informed of the
bid at 4:05 p.m. and CDC filed their Schedule 13D with the SEC at 4:40 p.m. At 5:30
p.m. the public announcement was released for publication on the next day. 366 F. Supp.
at 384-85.
103 Id. at 385.
104 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-4, -101 (1974). See notes 22-24 supra.
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with shareholders except in open court. °5 CDC was given permission to
extend its tender offer and announce current progress. CDC at all times
offered, and presented to the court, amended tender offers setting
forth disclosures deemed necessary by Texasgulf."'
The court found no basis for any of Texasgulf's allegations, but,
as it said on one point, in reference to potential conflicts of interest
arising from a successful takeover,
since so much was made of it during this hearing, and since CDC
bas offered to do equity and acknowledge it in its amended tender
offer, this Court will agree that it should be disclosed' 07
On another point, the court found,
CDC could not reasonably have been expected to disclose this
information because it was not available to them and could not
have been discovered with reasonable effort since there was nothing
in any of the public filings to inform CDC of this possible problem
.... CDC cannot be held responsible to disclose the contents
of Texasgulf's private files.' 08
"However," the court said, "now that the information has come to light
it should be put before the stockholders as an amendment to the tender
offer ....
On September 4, the court extended the temporary restraining
order against CDC for ten days to allow CDC time to amend its offer
and for Texasgulf to apply for an appeal."0 On September 12, Texas-
gulf announced a $46 million expansion program" and on September
14, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals extended the order against CDC
pending Texasgulf's appeal to be heard on October 10.11 Later, Texas-
105 366 F. Supp. at 388 n.11.
'-6 Id. at 421.
'
0 7 Id. at 422.
108 Id. at 426.
The information in question concerned the possibility of losing management rights
over two Australian mining projects. No investment could be lost, only the power to
manage the projects if Texasgulf's partner in the venture so decided. The investments
were only generally discussed in the 1972 Texasgulf Annual Report with no mention of
the management agreement. In the company's 10-K filing with the SEC, the two projects
were lumped with "other subsidiaries." 366 F. Supp. at 425 & n.77.
109 Id. at 427.
110 Id. at 431-32.
11 N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1973, at 73, col. 2.
112 See No. 73-3137, 5th Cir., Sept. 13, 1973, unreported order on file with INDxANA
LAw JOURNAL. See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1973, at 57, col. 2. The order was origi-
nally extended until December 1973, but the court granted CDC's motion for an ex-
pedited hearing and rescheduled it for October 10, 1973 (order on file with INDiANA LAW
JOUmNAL). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1973, at 48, col. 6.
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gulf announced a new ore strike..3 and high earnings.'"
On October 10, the court of appeals dissolved the restraining
order."' But, on October 13, the New York Stock Exchange suspended
trading of Texasgulf stock because the price had been driven above the
offer price and a dispute arose among tendering brokers and the CDC
depository concerning the allowable time for withdrawal of tendered
shares.'1
The trial court dearly understood the necessity of keeping the
shareholders informed as to matters arising during normal operations
of their company and as to matters coming to light at the trial. How-
ever, since the original fault fell on management and since CDC was
at all times willing to disclose, the court should have minimized its
intervention, using a conditional injunction as a means of preserving its
jurisdiction if CDC failed to comply adequately.
The intervention by the appellate court displays the method by
which courts misplace sympathies and disregard the interests of the
offeror and the shareholders. In so doing, the court denies not only the
investment opportunity but also the complete dissemination of material
information.
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IN FASHIONING INJUNCTIvE RELIEF
The Texasgulf case represents an ideal situation for the use of the
conditional injunction discussed above. The offeror was dear about its
willingness to disclose the information once the court decided disclosure
was necessary. In addition, the offeror was willing to extend the tender
offer in order to allow for sufficient dissemination of the new informa-
tion. This willingness is a necessary precondition to the use of con-
ditional injunctive relief. Where the offeror is not willing to make
disclosure or to extend the tender offer, such a remedy would be inap-
propriate.
In the first place, there may not be sufficient time for dissemination
of the required information before the scheduled expiration date of the
tender offer. In addition, the offeror may not be willing to extend the
expiration date because of market or other conditions extrinsic to the
offer." 7
I N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1973, at 38, col. 3.
3.4 Id., Oct. 6, 1973, at 33, col. 5.
115 No. 73-3137, 5th Cir., Oct. 10, 1973, unreported order on file with INDIANA LAW
JoumwAL. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1973, at 71, col. 2.
"16 N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1973, at 54, col. 1; id., Oct. 16, 1973, at 59, col. 7.
117 Such conditions may include a sudden upturn in the market, the announcement of
a competing tender offer, the negotiation of a merger between the target and another
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Secondly, the offeror may not be willing to disclose the information
because it wishes to contest its materiality. This unwillingness may be
simply a wish to avoid the costs of disseminating the new information
unless and until the information's materiality is proven at a trial on the
merits.
Alternatively, unwillingness to disclose may arise from the involve-
ment of statutory or administrative limitations on corporate activity,
such as licensing regulations or antitrust statutes that limit transfers
of control. Such limitations often mean old information attains a new
materiality.118 However, even though such information may potentially
be material to an investor making an investment decision, the offeror
may legitimately not wish to disclose until materiality is proven at trial
on the merits. This may be because the offeror may expect litigation on
the independent substantive issues alleged, such as a Sherman Act anti-
trust violation." 9 Any litigant would naturally be hesitant to make
available to the public all information, facts and theories in his pos-
session concerning such charges. 2
company, or a major change in interest rates or margin requirements that would affect
the financing of the offer. See notes 33, 37-40, 42 supra & text accompanying.
1 8 Owners assume their companies conduct their affairs within a regulatory frame-
work and the precise boundaries of that framework are rarely relevant to the investment
decision. However, when those boundaries are about to be breached and assets or op-
portunities thereby lost, the offeror should note the necessity to specify for the investor
the nature of the boundaries and the loss to be incurred. See note 85 supra.
119 Cases arising under the Williams Act often allege an antitrust violation and a
failure to disclose (under the Williams Act) that the successful consummation of the
offer would create the antitrust violation. In such cases, a full trial on the merits of the
antitrust allegation will be needed if the tender offer succeeds in causing a de facto
merger of the two companies.
120 The purpose of the Williams Act is the protection of investors, but the scope of
that protection is not as broad as some courts would seem to prefer. The Act is framed
in terms of disclosure and informed investor decisions rather than in terms of a catch-all
source of authority for enjoining all potential adverse effects on the value of stock hold-
ings. The Act was not meant to provide a bootstrap preliminary remedy if allegations
of a substantive harm, e.g., violations of the antitrust laws, were insufficient to support a
preliminary injunction on their own merits. In other words, Williams Act injunctions
should be used to enforce Williams Act purposes, not to enjoin all potentially unlawful
actions. This principle was applied in Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc.,
[Current] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 94,595 (2d Cir. June 10, 1974). In that case, both
the district court and the appellate court found adequate grounds to issue injunctive re-
lief on the basis of allegations of possible Clayton Act, section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970),
violations. (The district court enjoined the tender offer. The appellate court remanded
with instructions to frame an injunction that would allow the tender offer to continue.)
Both courts refused to enjoin the tender offer on grounds of failure to disclose the anti-
trust violations, finding that
it would not have been unreasonable for Cargill's management [the offeror] to
have concluded after appropriate inquiry that no substantial antitrust obstacles
stood in the way of its acquisition. Therefore, under the circumstances before
us, the possibility that the acquisition would result in antitrust violations, a pos-
sibility that exists with every merger, need not have been disclosed to Missouri
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In any of these cases of initial offeror unwillingness to extend the
offer or unwillingness to disclose the information until trial on the
merits, there may still be alternative remedies to full-fledged injunctions.
Such alternatives should be less destructive of tender offers and more
compatible with the finely tuned statutory balance of the Williams Act.
Most judges and commentators agree that the time of the initial
petition is the best opportunity for the courts to exercise their equitable
powers, but a conflict centers around whether equity should enjoin all
potential injury or whether a practical appraisal should be made of
discrepancies occurring in the heat of battle. 1 '
If a court opts for the "heat of battle" theory and allows the
tender offer to continue, pending a trial on the merits, it faces the task
of reversing the takeover should management or objecting stockholders
succeed in proving the illegality of the offer. 2 Th ! task of unraveling
may be formidable, if not impossible, if the offeror has exercised control,
made changes, created a situation of potential competitive restraint that
is illegal per se under antitrust laws, or caused a transfer of control
over a licensed right that is unlawful under the licensing statute. On
the other hand, it would be equally impractical for a court to order con-
summation of a tender offer that was made unprofitable by the improvi-
dent granting of an injunction and disruption of the schedule.
These problems could be overcome by a preliminary injunction
limited to enjoining consummation of the tender offer, but not enjoining
the solicitation and collection of shares. The court's equitable powers
could be used to order tendered stock into escrow, preventing the
raider from exercising voting rights and control. Pendente lite beneficial
ownership of the stock by the raider would not create a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust or licensing statutes that limit transfers of control
of companies or privileges. This solution is neutral as between manage-
Portland's [the target's] shareholders.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., mpra at 96,095-25 n.44 (quoting the dis-
trict court opinion).
'1 Compare Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
948 (2d Cir. 1969) (preliminary injunction denied): "[T]he participants on both sides
act, not 'in the peace of a quiet chamber,' [citing cases] but tnder the stresses of the
market place," with Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247
(2d Cir. 1973) (preliminary injunction granted) :
Thus, in the normal situation, when it appears likely that the offer may contain
materially misleading statements or omissions as made, the interest of the share-
holders and of the public in full disclosure of relevant circumstances renders
preliminary injunctive relief an appropriate method of remedying the deficiencies
in disclosure before the offer is consummated.
Id. at 250-51 (emphasis added).




ment and the raider. However, tendering stockholders are left in the
position of uncertainty of their sale. This situation is easily cured
by an additional order allowing, but not requiring, the withdrawal of
tendered shares.'23 Stockholders wishing to promote the success of the
offer or wishing to reap the premium value could leave their shares with
the bidder. Those stockholders with other needs would be able to
recover their shares.
The benefits available from this proposed remedy will vary from
case to case, but generally the offeror is saved the expense and time of
reregistering and republicizing his tender offer. The offeror is also
enabled to move swiftly to consummate the offer if the offeror is success-
ful at a trial on the merits. A third benefit to the offeror is the limitation
of management's defensive tactics if escrow-held shares cannot be voted
to provide requisite shareholder approval.'
The use of this remedy can be illustrated by reference to Gulf +
Western Industries v. The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co." 5 G + W,
the offeror, sought to enjoin the target from violating section 14(e),
alleging false and misleading statements and omissions of material facts.
A & P counterclaimed for injunctive relief alleging omissions of
material facts and possible antitrust violations if the tender offer were
consummated.
A & P based its counterclaim on the alleged antitrust violations and
violations of section 14(e) by failure to disclose G + W's intention
to gain sufficient control of A & P to influence policies and failure to
disclose G + W's other holdings and their possible antitrust implica-
tions. A & P alleged both horizontal and vertical anticompetitive effects
arising primarily from Bluhdorn's interests in Bohack and possible
subtle pressures for reciprocal dealing between G + W's other sub-
sidiaries and suppliers to A-& P. In a carefully reasoned opinion, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals found the antitrust implications to be
adequate for the issuance of a preliminary injunction." Following that
1
2
8 The statute allows withdrawal of tendered shares until the expiration of seven
days after definitive copies of the offer or request are first published or given to security
holders. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1970) (quoted in note 13 Mupra). However, no
definition of "definitive" is given. Since the purpose of the enactment of the Williams
Act was to make disclosure part of the offer, it would seem that the seven day with-
drawal provision would not become operative until satisfactory disclosure (as part of
the offer) is made.
124For example, shareholder authorization of management proposals may not be
provided if the corporation's charter or by-laws require approval by two-thirds of the
outstanding shares and more than one-third of the shares are held in escrow.
'15 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the facts and parties in this
dispute see note 99 supra.
126 476 F.2d at 698-99. The court held that there was no right to proceed with a
[Vol. 50:114
CASH TENDER OFFERS
finding, the court also decided that the antitrust problem was material
and should have been disclosed.
The court was entirely correct in finding the necessity for disclosure
of the potential antitrust implications, especially since the facts showed
that the problem had been considered to be of some relevance by the
offeror. However, since the bidder had attempted to overcome the
problem and there was some likelihood that the attempt would have been
successful, the court may have been better advised to simply order the
stock into escrow, rather than stop the tender offer. This proposed
remedy integrates well with the shareholder-protective scheme of the
Williams Act. It provides the investor with the needed information and
allows the shareholders the continued opportunity to make their own
decisions.
It is impossible to fashion a universal remedy satisfactory to all
parties concerned. However, all parties have a common interest in the
quick resolution of the dispute and this interest should be recognized
by the courts in striving toward the objective of rinimizing the extent
and duration of the courts' role in the offer.' As Judge Friendly said,
citing a much higher authority, the court should "let the punishment
fit the crime.""2
CONCLUSIONS
Recent court decisions have apparently lost sight of the purposes
and intent of the Williams Act, as a part of the entire plan of securities
law, to protect investors by requiring disclosure of material informa-
tion. The intent of the Williams Act was not to eliminate tender offers
or the market for corporate control, but to allow investors the oppor-
tunity to make informed investment decisions based on adequate infor-
rnation in a free and open market.
Various areas of the securities law, regulations, and stock exchange
rules require disclosure of information by management. Tender offer
disclosure requirements should be viewed in context with these other
requirements to avoid unnecessary duplication of information and to
avoid shifting all disclosure burdens from management to the tender
tender offer unlawfully violating antitrust laws.
127 FED. 1. Civ. P. 65, which authorizes the issuance of injurctive relief, itself recog-
nizes the need for quick resolution of a dispute. The rule requires priority in scheduling
hearings if notice was not given before the issuance of a tempon.ry restraining order and
allows advancement and consolidation of the trial on the merits with the hearing on the
injunction.
128 Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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offeror. A viable standard would consider information previously
judged, then disclosed or omitted, by management. The only new in-
formation required would be plans and proposals bearing a present intent
of execution by the raider, some information about the raider if it is not
publicly available, and explanations of the fact and consequences of
ancillary regulatory restrictions that would not be known to the public
and that would be relevant to the future operations and opportunities of
the corporation under new control. Old information acquiring renewed
importance and previously undisclosed information may be added to the
offeror's burden if that is the only means for adequately protecting the
investing public.
The purposes of the law could be better served if the courts were
to relax their tendency to enjoin all offers and to fashion remedies more
suitable to presenting information to the public without tipping the
balance of interests to protect incumbent managements.
RONALD W. OAKES
